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European Welfare Regimes: 
Political Orientations versus 
Poverty 
 
Summary: This inquiry analyzes how political orientations shape welfare states
and labour market institutions when seeking to reduce poverty. In order to
identify effects of these two key variables, we conduct a panel regression anal-
ysis that includes two poverty measures: poverty rates before and after social
spending. This inquiry considers 14 EU countries, and in the period from 1995
to 2008, which are grouped according to welfare state regimes. We consider
Social Democratic, Corporatist, Mediterranean and Liberal welfare state re-
gimes. Panel regression results indicate that political orientation engenders no
significant statistically measurable effects on poverty rates before social spend-
ing. Effects register, however, as significant when considering poverty rates
after social spending. With respect to the first set of results, we advance two
key explanations. First, we note a longer period of time is necessary in order to
observe actual effects of political orientation on market generated poverty. 
Second, political parties with their respective programs do not register as in-
fluential enough to solve social problems related to income distribution when
taken alone. Influences register as indirect and are expressed through changes 
in employment rates and social spending. The second set of results support the
hypothesis that a selected political regime does indeed contribute to poverty
reduction. In sum, political orientation and political regime does indeed affect
poverty through welfare state institutions, as well as through labour market
institutions.
Key words: Welfare state regimes, Social spending, Poverty, Political orienta-
tions, European Union. 
JEL: D63, H53, I38.
 
 
 
 
Connections between policies of left and right-oriented political parties, income dis-
tribution and levels of extant poverty has attracted attention of numerous researchers, 
and especially economists and sociologists. Curiously, exertion of political influence 
registers as more indirect rather than direct because actions of political parties shape 
market institutions and also welfare states: key mechanisms through which society 
mitigates distributional challenges. Influences exerted by market institutions on pov-
erty rates are manifested primarily through changes in employment rates. In eco-
nomic theory, there is almost a universal agreement that unemployment serves as an 
underlying source of poverty. (De)regulation of labour markets could indeed cause 
increases in employment rates for groups faced with falling or remaining under pov-
erty lines. It is the active approach, representing a transition for the “poor” from a 
category as beneficiaries of social aid to the category of net taxpayer, which not only 
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reduces poverty but also by increasing national income, and also creates conditions 
for a sustainable implementation of passive policies. Welfare state institutions deal 
with levels of poverty primarily through social spending. By changing the extent and 
structure of social transfers, there are also the changes in the level of income of the 
poor population, affecting their positions in the distributional matrix relative to set 
poverty lines. We consider distribution in this manner as essentially “passive” ap-
proach as the social problems of and related to poverty are dealt with through the 
redistribution of national income, regardless of influences on levels of actual or po-
tential national income. 
In this sense, we could qualify that a main objective of the welfare state is to 
reduce poverty while also dealing with economic inequality. Hence, theories consid-
ering welfare states provide an adequate framework for the understanding of levels of 
measurable effects engendered by political orientations, and especially the key rela-
tionships between market institutions and social spending and their effects on levels 
of poverty. However, theories of welfare states should not be considered unique with 
respect to importance attributed to relationships between political variables and pov-
erty, on the one hand, and then labour markets and welfare state institutions, on the 
other. In general, it is possible to distinguish between two approaches: (i) structural – 
an approach that emphasizes the importance of structural-functional factors, and (ii) a 
political-economic approach that emphasizes roles played by political factors. The 
political-economic approach emphasizes the key role of political orientation in de-
termining the level and dynamics of poverty in developed democracies. Market and 
welfare state institutions are strongly influenced by the political processes. The 
dominance of the left-wing parties is associated with the strengthening of the welfare 
state institutions while the right-wing parties give emphasis on the deregulation i.e. 
the implementation of market mechanisms in solving social problems.  
On these bases, it is possible to further distinguish between two basic ap-
proaches in the implementation of social policy: (i) liberal - primarily favoured by 
conservative and right wing parties and (ii) the redistributive - closer to social de-
mocratic and leftist parties. The division of the liberal welfare into the state and re-
distributive models represents a rough theoretical framework within which specific 
types of welfare states are profiled, also recognizable in the specific practices of in-
dividual countries. Having in mind the diversities present in the sources, the EU is 
characterized by four main models: the Social Democratic, Corporatist, Mediterra-
nean and the Liberal welfare state regime. 
The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent is the impact of political 
orientations to poverty compatible with the given theoretical framework of the wel-
fare state, starting from the structural relations vs. social-economic, liberal vs. redis-
tributive approach, as expressed through the practice of the Social Democratic, Cor-
poratist, the Mediterranean and the Liberal welfare state regime. 
 
1. Literature Survey and the Methodological Framework  
 
In the literature, a greater number of both quantitative and comparative historical 
approaches to the settings of the political-economic approach to welfare state were 
accessed. In accordance with their significance, the following are most prominent 
 653 European Welfare Regimes: Political Orientations versus Poverty 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue, pp. 651-674
(John D. Stephens 1979, 1995, 2001, 2003; John Myles 1984, 2002; Gösta Esping-
Andersen 1985, 1999, 2007; Francis G. Castles 1996, 2002, 2003). Most research 
focuses on the influence of the left-wing parties on the institutions of the welfare 
state and the consequent poverty and economic inequality (Donald Sassoon 1996; 
Erik Olin Wright 2000; David Brady 2003; Lane Kenworthy 2004; Andrew S. Full-
erton and Jennifer Moren-Cross 2009). However, in recent years, there has been sub-
stantial research of the impact of right-wing parties (Clarence Y. H. Lo and Michael 
Schwartz 1998; James P. Allan and Lyle Scruggs 2004; Brady and Kevin T. Leicht 
2008). Most of the findings are in compliance with the conventional view of the wel-
fare state by which the differences in social spending, as well as in the scope of the 
welfare state, can explain the success of the left-wing parties, especially those of the 
social-democratic orientation of along with strong unions.  
 In selecting the research method, we began with the assumption of four pos-
sible relationships between political orientation, poverty and the welfare state: 
First, the political orientation affects the poverty reduction regardless of the 
welfare state program. Greater representation of the left-wing parties in the govern-
ment reduces the poverty rate before social transfers, by which the importance of 
redistribution in solving social problems decreases. The empirical confirmation of 
these settings is in line with the political-economic approach and within it, the Lib-
eral welfare state model. 
Second, the political orientation has an impact on poverty reduction through 
welfare state programs. The dominance of the left-wing parties reduces the poverty 
rate after social transfers, which suggests that political orientation is primarily mani-
fested through policies and mechanisms of the welfare state. Social transfers have the 
key role in poverty reduction, whose size and structure depends on the distribution of 
political power between parties of left and right. Such understanding is in line with 
political-economic approach of the redistributive welfare state model. 
Third, political orientation and institutionalized welfare state have an impact 
on poverty reduction. Social spending reduces poverty after social transfers, but the 
impact of political orientation on poverty does not consist only of the social transfers. 
Activities of political parties on poverty manifest themselves through social spending 
and employment. From a theoretical point of view, it is the political-economic expla-
nation of the welfare state, which implies a combination of liberal and redistributive 
model in politics. 
Fourth, in addition to the mentioned three possibilities, a case according to 
which political orientation has no significant effect on poverty is possible. The regu-
lation of labor markets and /or redistribution in favour of the poor depends on the 
political importance that society attaches to poverty, as decided by the social groups 
which are not at risk of poverty and on which the poor who can not have any signifi-
cant effect. The poor belong to a politically vulnerable the population since they can-
not directly represent their interests through the institutions of government. Even if 
they are members of parties or trade unions, their voice is very weak due to lack of 
influence on legislative activity, both through their elected representatives and 
through lobbying. Labour market and redistribution policy, as a party of both the left 
and right orientation, is primarily driven by the interests of the most numerous and 
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most politically relevant social groups. Consequently, the change of power between 
the right and the left orientation does not significantly change the position at the 
lower segment of the population income distribution. If this hypothesis should be 
confirmed it would imply the rejection of the political-economic and the acceptance 
of structural-functional approach to the welfare state.  
From the assumptions above, four hypotheses about the possible impact of the 
political orientation on poverty are defined.  
H1. The influence of political orientation on the level and dynamics of poverty 
is primarily manifested through employment. 
H2. The influence of political orientation on the level and dynamics of poverty 
is manifested through social spending. 
H3. The influence of political orientation on the level and dynamics of poverty 
is manifested through social spending but also through employment. 
H4. Political orientation has no significant effect on the level and dynamics of 
poverty. 
In order for the aforementioned hypotheses to be tested, it is necessary to ana-
lyze the impact of political orientation on the two indicators of poverty: (i) poverty 
before social transfers and (ii) poverty after social transfers. The poverty rate before 
social transfers reflects a market-generated poverty. This indicator is meant to com-
pare the observed risk of poverty with a hypothetical measure of a risk of poverty in 
absence of all social transfers (other than pensions) all things being kept equal. The 
key influence on the level and dynamics of the poverty rate before social transfers is 
consisted in the activities of the labor market. High employment rate – low market-
generated poverty rate and vice versa, low employment rate – high market-generated 
poverty. 
The poverty rate after social transfers reflects poverty as a result of the appli-
cation of redistributive policies. The level and movement rate of poverty is a function 
of the generosity of the welfare state expressed through the social spending of the 
welfare-state. High social spending is associated with low poverty rates, while low 
social consumption leads to high poverty rates corresponding to market-generated 
poverty.  
The study was conducted with the use of a balanced panel model where the 
unit of analysis is the country-year with a total of 196 observations (N=14, T=14). 
During the selection of the approach in research of the links between the efficiency 
of the welfare state and poverty, several previous studies on the variations of poverty 
and inequality at the macro-comparative level served as a starting point (Arthur S. 
Alderson and François Nielsen 1999, 2002; Bjorn Gustafsson and Mats Johansson 
1999; Brady 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008; David Bradley et al. 2003; Scruggs and James 
2006; Brady and Leicht 2008). We analyzed the time period from 1995 to 2008. The 
data was taken from Klaus Armingeon et al. (2010), Comparative Political Data Set 
(1960-2008), Institute of Political Science, University of Berne (2010) and the Euro-
stat database1. 
                                                        
1 Eurostat. 2010. European Social Statistics. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessed May 5, 2010). 
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The paper examines the impact of poverty on the political orientation by using 
country-year as well as country-year grouped according to the regimes of the welfare 
state level of analysis. The starting point of welfare state typology is Esping-
Andersen’s classification of capitalist societies or the welfare states. He proposes the 
division of modern capitalist societies into three regimes: (i) Liberal, (ii) Social 
Democratic and (iii) Conservative-corporatist welfare state regime. The classification 
is based on two criteria: (i) decommodification, in the sense of independence of the 
individual from market outcomes, and (ii) social stratification, which indicates the 
possibility of movement of individuals between the existing social classes. In the 
paper, it is applied the extended Esping-Andersen’s classification by introducing the 
Mediterranean welfare state regime with sufficiently differentiated characteristics in 
relation to the liberal, social democratic and corporatist welfare state regimes. 
The main characteristic of the Liberal welfare state regime (UK and Ireland) is 
market-orientation in the distribution of resources and social protection benefits. 
Public provisions are modest, flat-rate, and means tested, producing a residual and 
stigmatised group of beneficiaries. The state encourages market solution by private 
welfare schemes. The decommodification effect is limited and the distribution of 
living conditions is closer related to the stratification created by market forces. The 
Conservative welfare state regime (Belgium, Germany, France, and Austria), rooted 
in corporatism and Catholic social policy, is identified by status-preserving interven-
tion, supporting the market logic of distribution. Family and motherhood are sup-
ported, women encouraged staying at home, and the one-breadwinner family is sup-
ported by benefits and taxation. In the Social Democratic welfare state regime (Swe-
den, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands), social policy is encompassing with 
high standards of material living conditions guaranteed, high levels of transfers as 
well as subsidised public service; hence also high levels of tax rates. The individual 
is the favoured unit instead of the family as in the conservative regime. The 
Mediterenian welfare state regime (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy) is characterise 
by limited history of full employment; but a recent history of authoritarian politics, 
where welfare politics is minimal and left to the household subsistence economy and 
a large informal sector. Poverty and inequality are higher compare with other welfare 
state regimes (Joachim Vogel 1999). 
By using the E-view 6 program, two specifications were evaluated: (i) model 
with fixed effects, and (ii) model with stochastic effects. The choice between fixed 
and stochastic specification was made based on the nature of the data, the objective 
of the research, and the correctness of the decision would later be verified with the 
application of the Hausman test.  
All three indicators pointed to a fixed specification. Firstly, the testing was 
conducted on a sample of 14 countries belonging to certain modes of the welfare 
state. The selection of countries was not carried out from a larger set in a stochastic 
approach suggesting a fixed specification. In the model, the number of countries (14) 
is equal to the time period (14), which is another argument in favour of fixed specifi-
cation. Secondly, from the standpoint of economic theory the assumption that the 
individual effects of the selected set have a decisive influence on the observed varia-
tion in the poverty rate can also be accepted. Thirdly, in all models the result of the 
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Hausman Chi-square test and p values indicate that the acceptance of the fixed and 
the rejection of the stochastic specifications. 
Model selection is based on the nature of the relationship between the depend-
ent and independent variables. As the most adequate, the semi-logarithmic model 
was selected, which, when compared to other alternative forms, most closely reflects 
the nature of the connection between the rate of relative poverty and the given ex-
planatory variables. The semi-logarithmic models describe the relations connected 
with slower growth of the dependent variable at higher values of the explanatory 
variables.  
In the model, the dependent variable is the rate of relative poverty while the 
key independent variables are measures for poverty reduction: social spending and 
employment rate. Such a relationship is best described with the semi-logarithmic 
models. There are two key explanations. First, in contrast to absolute poverty, rela-
tive poverty can not be reduced indefinitely as a result of the implementation of the 
redistributive and labor market policies. The relative poverty is calculated as the 
share of people having an equivalised disposable income that is below the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold. In society, there will always be a certain percentage of the popula-
tion whose income is below the average disposable income. Second, the poverty re-
duction expenditure per capita increase with reducing the number of the poor. Name-
ly, in the first phase, increasing social spending reduce the poverty rate in the part of 
the population whose income is closest to the poverty line. At the same time they are 
also the group with the lowest depth of poverty and consequently the poverty reduc-
tion expenditure are lowest per capita. The increase in social spending or employ-
ment rates is associated with the reduction of relative poverty by decreasing rate. 
In the first iteration, two models were evaluated. In the first model, the de-
pendent variable is the rate before social transfers, and in the second the poverty rate 
after social transfers. The at-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers is calculated 
as the share of people having an equivalised disposable income before social trans-
fers that is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold calculated after social transfers. 
The same at-risk-of-poverty threshold is used as for the at-risk-of-poverty rate after 
social transfers, set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income. 
Independent variables were divided into key and control variables. 
Key variables include the impact of the employment rate in the first model, 
and both employment and social spending, in the second model, the trend rate of 
poverty before i.e. after social transfers. As a key variable the political orientation 
indicator is involved. For this purpose, the Schmidt index of political concentration 
(GOVPARTY) was used, whose values, on a scale of 1 to 5, reflect the ruling politi-
cal ideology. Value 1 - the hegemony of right-wing parties - 0% share of the left-
wing parties in power; the value 2 - dominance of the right-wing and centre parties - 
part of the left-wing parties less than 33.33%; value 3 - uniform power of right and 
left-wing parties - the left-wing party participation in the government ranging be-
tween 33.33% and 66.66%; value 4 – the dominance of social-democratic and other 
leftist parties - the left-wing party participation in government higher than 66.66% 
and the value 5 - the hegemony of social-democratic and other parties of the left-
wing - 100% participation of the parties of the left-wing in the government.  
 657 European Welfare Regimes: Political Orientations versus Poverty 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue, pp. 651-674
The dominance of the right-wing and left-wing parties may have a different 
impact on poverty rate depending on whether it is observed the poverty rate before or 
after social transfers. The dominance of right wing political parties has a greater in-
fluence on poverty reduction if we analyze the poverty rate before social spending 
whereas the dominance of left wing political parties has a greater influence on pover-
ty reduction if we analyze the poverty rate after social spending. As a result, if we 
change the cabinet composition toward the left wing political parties (expressed by 
increasing the GOVPARTY variable in the model) the poverty rate before social 
spending might increase but after social spending will decrease. 
The control variables in the first model are: the percentage of population over 
65 (ELDERLY), the Gini coefficient (GINI), the rate of economic growth (GDPGR), 
debt (DEBT), the public and mandatory private expenditures for training programs at 
work, expressed as a percentage of the GDP (TRAINING_PMP), the index of capital 
account openness (KAOPEN) and the level of union organization (UD). The index 
for the extent of openness in capital account transactions incorporates a variable indi-
cating the presence of multiple exchange rates, a second variable indicating restric-
tions on current account transactions and a third variable indicating the requirement 
of the surrender of export proceeds. The higher the value the more open is the coun-
try to cross-border capital transactions. In the second model, control variables in-
clude: percentage of population over 65 (ELDERLY), public debt (DEBT) and the 
rate of economic growth (GDPGR). Control variables reflect economic and demo-
graphic determinants of poverty. 
The EMPRATIO* variable shows the impact of employment rate on the po-
verty rate in the welfare state regimes compare to the EU-14 average. The EMPRA-
TIO* variable is calculated by taking to the starting model dummy variables for the 
countries belonging to the particular welfare state regimes and multiplying them with 
the series EMPRATIO. If the obtained value of the EMPRATIO* variable is statisti-
cally significant, the impact of employment on poverty rate, in the analysed welfare 
state regime, is different from the EU-14 average. The gap size is calculated by add-
ing the value of variables EMPRATIO and EMPRATIO* for the analysed welfare 
state regimes. Depending on the sign of EMPRATIO* variables, there are two possi-
ble forms of deviation: (i) upwards deviation (negative sign) and (ii) downwards de-
viation (the positive sign). The upwards deviation indicates that the impact of em-
ployment on poverty reduction, in the observed model of the welfare state regime, is 
above the EU-14 average, and vice versa, the downwards deviation - the impact of 
employment on poverty reduction is below the EU-14 average. 
From economic perspective, the EMPRATIO* variable is a rough approxima-
tion of the effects of structural factors, typical for certain welfare state regimes, on 
poverty rate. Namely, unemployment is a key cause of poverty in all countries and 
welfare state regimes in the EU. It follows that the most effective way to reduce pov-
erty is to increase employment. However, the impact of employment on poverty re-
duction is not the same in all countries and welfare state regimes, which is explained 
by the influence of structural factors on poverty, labor market and welfare state. The 
structural factors include a number of factors which can not be controlled by the 
market and welfare state mechanisms for poverty reduction in the short term, such as: 
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the culture of poverty, institutional features of labor markets and welfare states. As 
the result of structural factors, the determinants of poverty differ between the coun-
tries and the welfare state regimes.  
 
2. Results  
 
By using the explained methodological framework, whether and how political orien-
tation affects poverty in the EU-14 countries, classified by welfare state regimes was 
tested. For each independent variable, the value of the regression coefficient with 
associated probability p was shown. The level of significance of evaluation is mov-
ing within the range from 1 to 10% with the use of the double-sided test. Because of 
the potential problem of multicollinearity, the same indicator of political orientation 
is applied in every model – the Schmidt index of political concentration. 
Initially, a large number of independent variables were included in the model 
but insignificant variables were omitted from the final preview. Each of the variables 
analyzed had the expected signs. However, with the first model - the rate of market-
generated poverty, variables, the degree of openness capital accounts and the level of 
union organization and in the second model - the poverty rate after social spending, 
the variable rate of economic growth have proved to be insignificant. 
 
 
Table 1  Market Generated Poverty 
 
Dependent variable: lpov_bef 
Panel model with individual fixed effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
C 3,563 0,000*** 4,155 0,000*** 3,640 0,000*** 3,579 0,000*** 3,550 0,000*** 
EMPRATIO -0,010 0,007*** -0,018 0,001*** -0,010 0,011** -0,010 0,007*** -0,010 0,008*** 
ELDERLY 0,023 0,047** 0,022 0,056* 0,025 0,030** 0,024 0,059* 0,023 0,094* 
GINI 0,009 0,051* 0,010 0,039** 0,011 0,026** 0,009 0,053* 0,009 0,054* 
GDPGR -0,007 0,091* -0,008 0,049** -0,008 0,062* -0,007 0,095* -0,007 0,097* 
DEBT -0,002 0,059* -0,003 0,015** -0,002 0,023** -0,002 0,059* -0,002 0,061* 
TRAINING_PMP -0,408 0,000*** -0,437 0,000*** -0,444 0,000*** -0,408 0,000*** -0,408 0,000*** 
GOVPARTY 0,001 0,753 0,001 0,858 0,000 0,969 0,001 0,752 0,001 0,758 
EMPRATIO*DMWR   0,009 0,053*       
EMPRATIO*SDWR     -0,009 0,061*     
EMPRATIO*CWR       -0,001 0,846   
EMPRATIO*LWR         0,000 0,9653 
R-squared 0,777  0,783  0,783  0,777  0,777  
Adjusted R-squared 0,741  0,746  0,746  0,739  0,739  
Hausman test 20,129 0,005 23,380 0,009 25,712 0,004 18,340 0,050 16,435 0,088 
 
Source: Developed by authors using data from Armingeon et al (2010); Comparative Political Data Set 
(1960-2008); Institute of Political Science, University of Berne (2010); and Eurostat (2010). 
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In the first model, the explanation for the insignificance of the openness of 
capital accounts in reducing market-generated poverty should be sought in the fact 
that EU countries which have abolished all formal barriers to free movement of capi-
tal are the subject of analyses. Free movement of capital is one of four key freedoms 
underlying the EU common market. The differences in the degree of openness of 
capital accounts are primarily a result of regulation of capital flows from and to third 
countries. Since most external investments in the EU come from other member 
states, it is quite realistic to expect a lack of significant differences between countries 
regarding the impact of capital openness on the rate of poverty. 
When it comes to the impact of the degree of union organization on the pov-
erty rate, it is a positive relation. When other factors are constant, the increase in the 
degree of union organization increases the rate of market-generated poverty. In eco-
nomic theory, a great number of explanations for the trade-off between the activities 
of trade unions and poverty are accessible. One of the most famous is the insider - 
outsider theory. Union members are the insiders and the unemployed are the outsid-
ers. Unions focus the interests of its members in terms of requirements for stability of 
earnings and position. Consequently, rigid structures of the labor market which re-
duce the possibility of obtaining work for the unemployed are created. Because the 
unemployed at risk of poverty are the most vulnerable social group, a greater degree 
of union organization leads to higher unemployment and poverty. 
 
 
Table 2  Welfare State Mediated Poverty 
 
Dependent variable: lpov_after 
Panel model with individual fixed effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
C 3,695 0,000*** 3,929 0,000*** 3,378 0,000*** 3,843 0,000*** 3,715 0,000*** 
SOCEXP_T_PMP -0,023 0,000*** -0,025 0,000*** -0,015 0,033** -0,023 0,000*** -0,021 0,001*** 
EMPRATIO -0,009 0,017** -0,013 0,009*** -0,010 0,010** -0,009 0,012** -0,007 0,073* 
DEBT -0,005 0,000*** -0,005 0,000*** -0,004 0,000*** -0,005 0,000*** -0,005 0,000*** 
ELDERLY 0,029 0,011** 0,032 0,006*** 0,024 0,040** 0,040 0,001*** 0,023 0,057* 
GOVPARTY -0,008 0,092* -0,008 0,084* -0,007 0,170 -0,007 0,147 -0,008 0,097* 
EMPRATIO*DMWR   0,006 0,216       
EMPRATIO*SDWR     0,011 0,065*     
EMPRATIO*CWR       -0,015 0,032**   
EMPRATIO*LWR         -0,008 0,139 
R-squared 0,925  0,926  0,927  0,927  0,926  
Adjusted R-squared 0,917  0,917  0,918  0,919  0,917  
Hausman test 14,887 0,021 4,280 0,747 16,235 0,023 18,458 0,010 21,430 0,003 
 
Source: Developed by authors using data from Armingeon et al. (2010); Comparative Political Data 
Set (1960-2008); Institute of Political Science, University of Berne (2010) and Eurostat (2010). 
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However, the link between trade unions and poverty is not significant. In prac-
tice of the European countries significant variation in how the organization and goals 
of the labor union are present. Poverty reduction is not an explicit goal and the influ-
ence of unions on the degree of labor market rigidities is smaller than is commonly 
thought. Thus, in countries of the Social Democratic welfare regimes the highest de-
gree of trade union organization is present, 63 to 41 which is the average of the EU-
14. At the same time, the rate of market-generated poverty in these countries is al-
most identical to the average poverty rate in the EU-14, 27% to 26%. 
This is explained by the use of special concepts of social policy - the flex-
security which combines a flexible labor market, social security and active labor 
market policy. As the name suggests it is a combination flexibility and security. Con-
sequently, a high level of union organization in social-democratic countries is not 
followed by a rigid labor market and on this basis significant poverty of the unem-
ployed. 
In the second model for all countries, economic growth rate has the expected 
negative impact on the poverty rate before social transfers, but this effect is not sta-
tistically significant. Since within the first model of economic growth was a signifi-
cant factor, the explanation for the insignificance in the second model should be 
sought in the mutual relationship between the economic growth and social transfers 
in combating poverty. Overall, GDP growth may act toward strengthening, but also 
toward the weakening the influence of social spending on poverty. If the society be-
comes richer due to dynamic economic growth, then the state, through a system of 
taxes and contributions, collects more funds earmarked for social spending. Higher 
social spending is the most important mechanism for reducing poverty. The impact 
of economic growth on poverty is expected in terms of sign, but is not significant 
because it is manifested to a greater extent through social spending rather than 
through increasing employment. 
 
3. Discussion 
 
3.1 Market-Generated Poverty 
 
Political Orientation  
 
Political orientation in terms of greater participation of the left-wing party in power 
has the expected positive sign but that effect is not significant. In the analysis of 
market-generated poverty, it was presumed that employment is a key mechanism for 
poverty reduction. High employment rates are associated with the policy of promot-
ing economic growth which is closer to right than to left-wing parties. Generally, the 
right-wing parties prefer the supply side economic policy whose major components 
include tax reduction, deregulation of labor markets, reduce public spending, disman-
tling the welfare state, weakening the legal rights of unions, including the coopera-
tion with big business in shaping the economic and political environment. All these 
measures are aimed towards the deepening of economic inequality and poverty. 
However, the negative impact of poverty can be cancelled by the positive influence 
on economic growth and employment. The results show that in the case of market-
generated poverty, for the given group of countries in the observed period, the first 
 661 European Welfare Regimes: Political Orientations versus Poverty 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue, pp. 651-674
hypothesis on the primary impact of political orientations to poverty through labor 
market institutions is rejected.  
By further analysis of market-generated poverty rates, employment rates and 
political orientation has shown that countries with social-democratic orientation did 
not achieve significantly different results in the alleviation of poverty in the countries 
where the authorities belonged to the centre and right-wing parties. If we take as a 
criterion the above average employment rate (65%) and below the average poverty 
rate (25%) in 9 observations countries in which the authorities belonged to the right-
wing parties showed better result and in 8 observations the countries where the gov-
ernment was constituted out of left-wing parties. 
Such results can be interpreted in two different ways. First, it takes a long pe-
riod of time to understand the real effects of a political option on social welfare. Pov-
erty reduction as a result of stimulating economic growth and employment presumes 
the authority belonging to the right-wing parties in multiple terms in order to gain the 
power of effective control over the work of government. This power is accumulated 
over time because it is unlikely that institutionalized history of egalitarianism and 
free market may turn in a different direction immediately after the elections (Esping-
Andersen 1990). 
Secondly, it is possible that the effects of the measures of previous govern-
ments, oriented either right or left, came to the forefront after the government 
changes, having in mind that each newly elected government inherits institutions, 
legislation, administration, as well as all activities of the previous government. Many 
of the programs and reforms, including changes in the labor market take several 
years and their effects occur at the time that does not have to coincide with the rule 
of the political party that initiated the change. Therefore, caution is needed in inter-
preting the results in the field of social policy in countries where the government of-
ten changes. 
 
Employment and Active Labor Market Policy 
 
Employment rate and expenditure for active labor market measures have the ex-
pected negative sign and are significant determinants of poverty. The increases of the 
employment rates and higher expenditures for active measures of employment, 
alongside all other constant factors, have a strong impact on poverty reduction. Such 
findings favour the thesis that solving social problems through employment is the 
key determinant of market-generated poverty. 
The impact of employment on poverty is not the same in all regimes of the 
welfare state. Compared to the average EU-14, the above-average employment rate 
of significant impact on poverty reduction is present in the social-democratic group 
and below average in the Mediterranean group. In the remaining two modes, the cor-
poratist and liberal, the impact of employment on poverty corresponds to the average 
of the group. Social democratic countries have the best results in terms of employ-
ment. In the period from 1995 till 2008, the average employment rate in the social-
democratic group was 10 percentage points above the average of the EU-14. At the 
same time, the Mediterranean countries had almost identical results only with the 
opposite sign. 
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The stronger impact of employment in poverty reduction in social-democratic 
countries should be interpreted, first of all, through a high rate of female employ-
ment, higher expenditures for active labor market policies, including a high share of 
public services in the GDP. In all these areas, the social-democratic countries have 
the highest values in the EU-14. Thus, the employment rate of women in social de-
mocratic countries is 10 percentage points higher than in the EU-14, expenditures for 
active labor market measures are 60% higher than in the EU-14, the share of public 
services in GDP is 40% higher than the average EU-14. The data on the movement of 
the same indicators in the Mediterranean countries, where the deviations from the 
average of the EU-14 is almost identical to the social-democratic countries, only with 
a negative sign, speak in favour of the correctness of this approach. 
 
Economic Inequalities 
 
Economic inequality and poverty are different and the same time and related con-
cepts. Poverty is related to the standard of living of the population whose income is 
below the poverty line, while economic inequality is related to the standard of living 
of the entire population. Hence, it is possible to reduce or increase economic inequal-
ity and for the poverty to remain unchanged. Such a situation is apparent when the 
income is allocated in groups with no risk of poverty, while the position of the poor 
remains unchanged. At the same time, economic inequalities and poverty are related 
categories, as increased poverty leads to rising inequality. As a result, social policy 
usually states as a goal both the reduction of poverty and economic inequality. 
Panel regression results show that economic inequality increase market-
generated poverty. The increase in the Gini coefficient, alongside other constant fac-
tors, causes the growth of the poverty rate. Referring to the previously described rela-
tionship between poverty and economic inequality, we can conclude that the benefits 
of income growth and its market distribution are enjoyed to a greater extent by 
groups which are not at risk of poverty. In most EU-14 countries, in the period from 
1995 to 2008, a decline in economic inequality was recorded. If we bring the data on 
the movement of economic inequalities in connection with the movement of the pov-
erty rate before social transfers, in most countries changes in inequality are more 
prominent than changes in poverty. With this in mind, it can be concluded that not all 
social groups have the same benefits of economic growth and employment growth. 
In general, the absolute benefit of the non-poor population is higher when compared 
to the poor population. The explanation should be sought in the low level of human 
capital at their disposal which makes it difficult for the poor to access the labor mar-
ket, even when under the influence of economic growth, new positions are created. 
With regard to the political orientation, economic inequality and market-
generated poverty, the data corresponds to the expectations. If the parties of left and 
right-wing are ranked in relation to the below average poverty rate before social 
transfers and the below average value of the Gini coefficient, the number of observa-
tions with below average values for both indicators are twice higher where the parties 
in power belonged to the right-wing orientation rather than the left-wing orientation 
(14 vs. 6). 
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This result is well expected since the impact on poverty before redistributing 
is being analyzed. Policies that encourage economic growth and employment influ-
ence to a greater extent the economic inequality and poverty before social transfers 
than policies that advocate more prominent redistribution of income in society. 
 
Population Aging 
 
Panel regression results show that when other factors are constant, the increase in the 
participation of the elderly in total population results in the growth of market-
generated poverty. Such a result was expected bearing in mind that the older popula-
tion is in the group with above average risk of poverty. If we limit our analysis to the 
poverty rate before social transfers, there are two main explanations for the increased 
risk of poverty of the old population. 
First, the income of the old population is lower than the income of working-
age population, which increases the risk of poverty. Second, the ability to compen-
sate the missing additional income through involvement in the labor market is very 
limited with the old population. Hence, the market mechanism provides very little 
room for solving the problem of poverty of the old population. If we exclude social 
transfers from the analysis, the main available channel is help within the family 
based on the generational solidarity. Since the problem of an aging population and 
poverty in all countries has fiscal character, we devote more space to this issue in 
part of this article which comments on the results in terms of poverty rate after social 
transfers. 
 
Public Debt 
 
Public debt has a dual role in determining the level and dynamics of poverty. On one 
hand, the public debt affects the quality of business environment and investor expec-
tations. The high level of public debt is usually associated with the fall in invest-
ments because investors fear the growth of taxes as the ultimate means to balance 
public finances. This problem is particularly present in terms of economic integra-
tion, when barriers for free movement of capital are removed. In the final instance, 
lower tax rate can lead to the relocation of capacities to other countries and a rise in 
unemployment and poverty. Manoeuvring capabilities of the government to reduce 
public debt without raising taxes are limited due to lower credit solvency of the coun-
try and the resistance of unions and other interest groups to the limitation of public 
spending. The final result is the growth of poverty caused by the reduction in invest-
ments and employment. 
On the other hand, debt can have a negative impact on poverty levels. The 
largest share of public expenditure, which causes the growth of public debt, is the 
social spending, i.e. the measures with the ultimate goal of preventing and resolving 
social problems. Hence, a large public debt may be due to the efforts that the gov-
ernment seems to undertake with non-market solutions to combat poverty. In addi-
tion to social spending, public debt in itself may contain components that directly or 
indirectly - through the market, affect the level of poverty. In terms of market 
mechanisms, we refer to before all subsidies and other form of fiscal incentives for 
the economy and population. Employment in the public sector should also be added, 
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which falls into the realm of public spending that causes the growth of public debt 
due to the generally lower productivity of the public in comparison to the private 
sector. In both cases, the growth of public debt is associated with falling poverty 
rates. 
Panel regression results indicate a significant negative relationship between 
public debt and the rate of market-generated poverty. The growth of public debt, 
when other factors are constant, leads to a decrease in market-generated poverty. The 
explanation for this situation should be sought in greater negative impact of public 
debt through fiscal incentives for the economy and population on the poverty rate 
than the positive impact, through the fall in investments. This is corroborated by a 
small degree of fiscal harmonization in the EU. In addition to restrictions on the 
functioning of the euro zone, EU member states have almost full fiscal freedom, 
which is manifested through the adjustment of public finances and economic inter-
ests of the population taking into account the investment and employment. With the 
exception of few countries (mainly Greece), public debt has not led to significant 
decline of credit solvency of the country or in investments.  
 
3.2 Welfare State Mediated Poverty 
 
Political Orientation  
 
At first, it is necessary to note that political orientation, while keeping in mind the 
poverty rate after social transfers has a negative and, unlike the market-generated 
poverty, significant impact on poverty trends in the EU-14. The strengthening of the 
left-wing parties, for the given group of countries in the period from 1995 to 2008, 
was accompanied by a reduction in poverty rate.  
In the context of the set hypotheses, we are talking about the acceptance of 
hypothesis 3 according to which the impact of political orientation on the level and 
dynamics of poverty is manifested through the institutions of the welfare state but 
also independently from the welfare state. In other words, it is the combined impact 
where institutions and mechanisms and the welfare state and labor market mecha-
nisms reduce poverty with the support of the left-wing parties. 
Social spending, as an indicator of the generosity of the welfare state, when 
other factors are constant, has the strongest effect on poverty reduction. However, it 
is not about channelling effects in the sense that the impact of political orientation is 
solely manifested through social spending. At the same time, the variable rate of em-
ployment is also significant, which indicates that the effect of political orientation on 
poverty is manifested through the labor market. 
In this regard, it is logical to ask why in the case of market-generated poverty 
political orientation is not significant, while in poverty after social transfers it is a 
significant factor in the level and dynamics of poverty. There are two key explana-
tions. First, the effects of changes in government, in relation to right - left, on wel-
fare, are manifested fastest through changes in social spending. If the parties of the 
left-wing orientation want voters to show their commitment to solving social prob-
lems, the fastest reaction is the change in level of social transfers. Change course in 
social policy through social spending in many areas is only the change in the level 
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and requires no change i.e. institutional reform. Moreover, obtaining political con-
sensus to change the abundance of social programs without interfering in their func-
tioning is less uncertain in terms of coalition governments in regards to the measures 
that are easy to alter with the change of government.  
Second, changes in levels of social spending are a politically less controversial 
mechanism in comparison to the reforms of institutions, of the welfare state and labor 
markets as well. The reform of pension and health systems, or the (de)regulation of 
the labor market is contained in the agenda of political parties but they are still politi-
cally very risky projects. Any reform requires a waiver in the present to achieve 
greater benefits in the future. From the perspective of the ruling party, the reforms 
are a less attractive instrument because of a possible change of government, because 
of the price of reforms that voters are paying, so that the final political gain can bene-
fit a government that did not even participate in initiating and implementing change. 
The results of econometric analysis have showed that the impact of political 
orientation on the poverty rate after social transfers in the EU-14 is expected, in 
terms of the sign, and statistically significant. However, in the case of welfare state 
models, this impact is not statistically significant for the Social Democratic and the 
Corporatist Welfare state regime. This deference is primarily explained by structural 
factors that diminish the impact of changing political orientation on poverty.  
The EMPRATIO* analysis shows that the influence of structural factors in the 
the Social Democratic and the Corporatist welfare state regime is higher than the EU-
14 average. The Social Democratic and the Corporatist Welfare state regime have 
more developed institutions of the welfare state and labor market compared with the 
Liberal and the Mediterranean Welfare state regime. In addition, they have more sta-
ble economies and a lower average poverty rate. In such circumstances, changes in 
political orientation is less expressed through poverty reduction compared with econ-
omies that are characterized by relatively unstable institutions of the welfare state 
and labor market, economic situation and higher poverty rates. 
 
Social Spending 
 
Panel regression results showed that, when other factors are constant, social spending 
is a key determinant of poverty rate after social transfers. This result was expected 
since the impact of social spending on poverty reduction is being considered. In all 
countries, and models of the welfare state there is a very noticeable negative relation-
ship between social spending and poverty. It is not necessary to outline the way in 
which social spending reduces poverty. Social spending is the main mechanism by 
which redistribution of the welfare state affects poverty and economic inequality. 
The analysis of the efficiency of social spending to combat poverty is much more 
interesting is a much more interesting issue. 
The countries of EU-14 are characterized by relative uniformity of social 
spending and the relative disparity in poverty rates. On one hand, the average social 
spending in the EU-14, in 2008 amounted to about 27% of GDP with little variation 
between countries. The ratio of social expenditure between countries with the most 
abundant social spending, Denmark, and the country with the least generous social 
spending, Ireland, is less than 1.5. On the other hand, the average rate of relative 
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poverty after social transfers amounted to about 15% but with significant variations 
between countries. Ratio of the rates of relative poverty of the country with the high-
est poverty rate (Greece) and lowest poverty rate (the Netherlands) is over 2. Differ-
ent levels and dynamics of social spending and poverty, point to differences in the 
effectiveness of the redistribution system, as observed in countries and welfare state 
regimes.  
Study of the efficiency of social spending to combat poverty mostly show high 
efficiency of the Social Democratic and Liberal, and low efficiency of the Mediterra-
nean and Corporatist model of the welfare state (José Adelantado and Eduardo 
Cuevas Calderón 2006; Luis Moreno 2006; Andre Sapir 2006; Jingjing Huo, Moira 
Nelson, and John D. Stephens 2008; Kosta Josifidis, Novica Supić, and Emilija 
Beker Pucar 2010). If the efficiency is an assumption of the sustainability of social 
spending, it is realistic to expect a reform of the inefficient, the Mediterranean and 
Corporatist regimes of the welfare state and in the direction of two possible alterna-
tives - the Anglo-Saxon deregulation and Scandinavian flexicurity. The current crisis 
of the neoliberal concept leaves little room for expectations that Europe, especially 
European countries with traditions and developed national consciousness, will begin 
to move toward greater deregulation. Scandinavian flexicurity is a more likely op-
tion. It is also important to note that in all modes the trend of rising social expendi-
tures is more noticeable, which is, moreover, most prominent in the least effective, 
the Mediterranean group. Thereby, the solutions for the increase in the efficiency 
should be sought primarily in the structural rather than in fiscal characteristics by 
which the welfare state regimes are differentiated. The influence of the political ori-
entation on the rate and direction of change is of great, if not decisive, importance. 
As for the relation between political orientation and social spending, by re-
viewing mutual relations it is evident that there was a higher level of social spending 
in countries where the authorities belonged to the parties of the left-wing rather than 
in countries where authorities belonged to the right-wing parties. In the period from 
1995 to 2008, a range of social spending in countries where the dominant parties be-
longed to the left-wing ranged from 32.5% of GDP (Sweden in 1995) to 17.34% of 
GDP (Greece 1995). At the same time, the range in countries where the authorities 
belonged to the right-wing parties went from 29.5% of GDP (France 2005) to 13% of 
GDP (Ireland 1998). Higher social spending in the first group is attributed to the 
greater commitment of left-wing parties to solve social problems by means of redis-
tribution. 
 
Employment 
 
Panel regression results showed that when other factors are constant, the increase of 
employment rates reduces the poverty rate after social transfers. This result was ex-
pected because along with the social spending, the growth in employment is a key 
mechanism for fighting poverty.  
In the first model, political orientation, in terms of the domination of the right-
wing party, was not a significant factor in curbing market-generated poverty, but the 
sign was in line with expectations. The positive influence of right-wing parties on 
poverty is interpreted by the means of supply side economic policies that are more 
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useful to the capital rather than the workers. The absence significant effects were 
explained by spill over effects and short term analysis horizon. 
In the second model, which considers poverty rate after social transfers, the 
dominance of the left-wing parties is a significant factor in reducing poverty. At the 
same time, this effect is also shown by social spending, as an indicator of the welfare 
state, and the employment rate as an indicator of the labor market. This result sug-
gests that the left-wing parties do not only manifest their impact on poverty solely 
through social spending but also through the labor market in terms of institutional-
ized social policy. 
In connection with the impact of the employment rate on poverty after social 
transfers, it is interesting to consider the extent to which social spending and em-
ployment are mutually channelled or that is not mutually channelled mechanisms in 
combating poverty. In the first case, it is a synchronous impact while in the latter 
case, the impact is ambivalent. In a theoretical sense, we talk about complementarity 
vs. exclusivity. Exclusivity refers to situations where generous social spending re-
duced incentives to work, in terms of labor supply, and reduces the number of new 
jobs created, in terms of demand for labor. Of course, in reality, the relationship be-
tween social spending and employment is regulated by more flexible instruments to 
reduce this sort of extreme exclusivity to a minimum. Thus, in most countries, the 
use of unemployment aid is conditioned by active measures to find jobs. Hence, it is 
more correct to speak of channelling vs. non-channelling of social spending and em-
ployment than about complementarity vs. exclusion. 
In order to analyze (non)-channelling, a decomposition of the employment rate 
according to the welfare state models was conducted. In short, the impact of em-
ployment on the poverty rate after social transfers is below average in social-
democratic countries and above the average for countries of the corporatist welfare 
state model. Below average effect implies channelled and above average a non-
channelled employment impact on poverty. The observed differences in the manifes-
tation of social spending and employment can be explained by different approaches 
in the organization of social protection systems and labor market regulation. 
Social Democratic countries, as previously mentioned, have, over time devel-
oped a special approach to social policy - flexicurity which involves a combination 
of a flexible labor market, social security and active labor market policy. Labor mar-
ket flexibility is achieved by a high degree of freedom of employers in hiring and 
firing workers. Social security is provided by generous unemployment benefits. It is 
a combination of efficiency and fairness. However, the operationalization of the idea 
is not feasible without the use of active labor market policies which, on one hand, 
allows retraining of workers to the needs of the market and on the other hand, pre-
vents the abuse of the unemployed status. The link between employment and social 
spending is indirect, through active labor market measures. The link between em-
ployment and social spending is indirect, through active labor market measures. The 
key source for financing the training and retraining is the social spending. As a result, 
we confirm the thesis of channelling effects as the effects of employment growth on 
poverty is comprised in social spending. In addition, high employment rate, espe-
cially of groups with above average poverty risk, in the public sector should also be 
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added. Employment in the public sector is the most obvious example of channelled 
effects when employment affects the poverty rate through social spending.  
In order to understand the low channelling of social spending and the em-
ployment of the corporatist model, it is necessary to point out the specifics of the 
organization of social protection systems in the corporatist model in comparison to 
the social democratic welfare state model. The social-democratic model, in its es-
sence, represents a combination of universalism with the generosity of the social 
program on one, and the comprehensive socialization of social risk on the other. In 
this way, social spending largely comprises and channels the effects of labor market 
on poverty. What is the situation with the corporatist model? 
The basis of the corporatist regimes of the welfare state is the Bismarckian 
tradition according to which the work merit, achievements and productivity, are a 
prerequisite for meeting the needs through the social security system. The concept of 
mandatory social insurance is applied where working contributions are the conditions 
for using the services of social protection systems. People without a work history can 
participate in the residual social assistance programs, but their role is marginal in 
comparison with the obligatory social insurance. Because of strict conditionality of 
employment and participation in programs of social protection, social spending has 
to a lesser extent the effects of labor markets in poverty reduction. Social problems 
are primarily addressed through the recruitment and use of social assistance on the 
basis of previous employment. 
 
Public Debt 
 
Panel regression results show that when other factors are constant, public debt has a 
significant negative impact on the poverty rate after social transfers. This result was 
expected given the ratio of public debt and social spending. 
In the structure of public expenditure, the most abundant component is the so-
cial consumption. Primarily, public debt is due to the cumulative faster growth of 
public expenditure over public revenues. Thus, the increase in public debt, in most 
cases, is based precisely on the excessive social spending. Since social spending is 
the key mechanism of reducing poverty, a negative relationship between the public 
debt and poverty assumed, as evidenced in the survey. 
From the perspective of political orientation, it is interesting to analyze how 
different political orientations influence the level of public debt. On the basis of the 
relationship between the political orientation and public debt, for the EU-14 countries 
during the period from 1995 to 2008, public debt over 60% of GDP in 47 observa-
tions (year and country) was present in countries where the dominant parties be-
longed to the left-wing orientation (political concentration index greater than 3) and 
45 cases in which the countries dominant parties belonged to the left-wing orienta-
tion (political concentration index is less than 3). This even score can be explained 
by the fact that a change of government does not automatically mean a reduction in 
public debt, since the new government inherits the previous state of public finances 
that can not be repaired within the time limits which coincide with election cycles. 
Therefore, the impact of political orientation on the budget deficit is a better indica-
tor. However, the data is uniform. If we take a budget deficit of 3% of GDP as a cri-
 669 European Welfare Regimes: Political Orientations versus Poverty 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue, pp. 651-674
terion, in three observations, the budget deficit higher than 3% of GDP was in the 
country in which the parties in power belonged to the right-wing orientation and in 4 
observations where the government was formed by right-wing parties. Therefore, the 
analysis of the impact of political orientation on the level of public debt and budget 
deficit requires long term series analysis and the inclusion of a broader institutional 
context. 
 
Population Ageing 
 
The results of the panel regression show that with other factors being constant, the 
increase of the share of elderly people in the total population after social transfers 
causes poverty growth. The obtained result was expected since ageing population 
represents a group which is exposed to the risk of poverty beyond average. There-
fore, the increase of the ageing population increases the number of people dependent 
on the social welfare. With constant social spending, the same amount of transfers is 
directed to the larger number of users, which deepens social problems.  
European Commission report from 2007 shows what kind of challenge is put 
forward for the European welfare state model. The report states that one quarter of 
the EU-15 adult population is older than 65. If current ageing trend continues, by 
2050 the share of ageing people in the total EU population will be 50%. The above 
mentioned trends seriously endanger the existing social models in Europe, especially 
in the field of regulating and financing social and health insurance.  
In order to obtain a better insight into the ageing and poverty problems in 
Europe, it is necessary to simultaneously observe the relation between the ageing 
population - dependant population and young one - working population. Dependency 
rate indicator of the elderly population is used for this purpose. In the last few dec-
ades, dependency growth rate of the elderly population has immensely started to en-
danger the fiscal situation in most European countries. According to the European 
Commission report from 2007, it is estimated that the dependency growth rate of the 
elderly EU-15 population will have resulted in the increase of the social security ex-
penditure between 5% and 7% GDP by 2020. With such trend, by 2040, health secu-
rity and pension expenditure will have doubled or even tripled in most of the EU-15 
countries.  
However, such predictions should be cautiously taken into account having in 
mind a high level of uncertainty in the working population projections. While moni-
toring the movement of the elderly population, it is relatively possible to determine 
precisely the dynamics of its reaching the retirement age, which makes these projec-
tions relatively reliable, together with the previously obtained mortality rate. With 
the working population, the situation is significantly more complex since it is quite 
difficult to predict with certainty if the birth rate will grow, fall or stagnate in the fu-
ture. Migration flows also have a significant role in determining number of the mem-
bers of the working population. In the circumstances of large influx of emigrants, it is 
possible to keep status quo at the employment market despite the decrease in the fer-
tility rate. EU-15 countries might be the best example of this because the total 
amount of population, not only working one, would be by far in decline if there was 
not for the migrations in them.  
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When the relation between political orientation, ageing process of the popula-
tion and poverty is concerned, this influence is indirect and primarily manifested 
through changes in regulations regarding the exercise of rights to have pensions and 
health security. On top of this, there are also opinions on the migrations and encour-
agement of programmes aiming to boost human capital of young population. Since 
changes in this field suggest reforms, whose results do not coincide with political 
cycles, it is not possible to notice in the given example more evident deviations be-
tween the left and right wing parties. The same goes for observing the particular wel-
fare state models.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper explores the impact of political orientation on poverty in the European 
welfare state models. Starting from a given theoretical framework: political-
economic vs. structural or liberal vs. redistributive welfare state approach, four hy-
potheses about the possible impact of political orientation on poverty have been de-
fined: (i) the impact of political orientation on the level and dynamics of poverty is 
primarily manifested through employment; (ii) the impact of political orientation on 
the level and dynamics of poverty is primarily manifested through social spending; 
(iii) the impact of political orientation on the level and dynamics of poverty mani-
fests itself through social spending but also through employment; and (iv) political 
orientation has no significant effect on the level and dynamics of poverty. Hypothesis 
testing was performed using a balanced panel models, the EU-15 countries without 
Luxembourg, in the period between 1995 and 2008.  
Two models have been evaluated: the model with market-generated poverty 
rate and model with welfare state mediated poverty. In the first model, the influence 
of employment and political orientation, as key variables, on the poverty rate before 
social transfers have been analysed, using the control variables: the share of ageing 
population in the total amount of the population, economic inequality, economic 
growth rate, public debt, active labor market measures, the degree of union organiza-
tion and openness of capital transactions. In the second model, the analysis also in-
clude social spending as a key variable while the control variables were reduced to 
the share of ageing population in the total amount of the population , economic 
growth rate and public debt. 
With market-generated poverty, the results showed that greater participation 
of the right wing parties in running the country lowers the poverty rate before social 
transfers, but that this influence is not significant. With other factors being constant, 
a key mechanism in reducing the poverty market is high employment rate. A more 
detailed analysis of market-generated poverty rates, employment rates and political 
orientation has shown that countries with social democratic orientation parties in 
power did not achieve significantly different results in the alleviation of poverty in 
comparison to the countries where right wing parties were in power. This is ex-
plained by the necessity for an analysis of a longer period in order to understand fully 
the real effects of a political option on the social welfare. Also, it is possible that the 
measures of the previous governments become more conspicuous with the change of 
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government, since each newly elected government inherits the institutions as well as 
the activities commenced by the previous government. 
For welfare state mediated poverty, the opposite results were obtained. Politi-
cal orientation has both a negative and significant impact on the poverty rate after 
social transfers. Such findings are consistent with the hypothesis on the combined 
impact of political orientation on poverty through social spending and employment. 
With regard to this, this paper promotes the thesis according to which the observed 
differences in the impact of political orientation on market-determined poverty and 
welfare state mediated poverty are primary the consequence of the determination of 
political parties to manifest their influence in the area of social policy primarily 
through the use of short-term measures, such as the change of levels in the social 
spending, rather than through the use of long-term measures, such as institutional 
reforms of the welfare state and labor market. Such approach not only provides faster 
results but it is politically less risky since the reforms take a long time and the final 
political gain can be obtained by a government that did not participate in the initiated 
implementation of changes. 
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